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1993 AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: PART II 
by Paul DeMuro 
In last month's discussion of the 1993 amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure David J. Stout addressed 
those amendments that affect the discovery process. This 
month's article explores the remaining amendments, empha­
sizing those changes that will have the greatest impact on 
Paul DeMuro 
practice in federal district 
court. A few comments on the 
retroactivity of the amend­
ments, however, precede the 
discussion of the latest batch 
of federal rules. 
The Supreme Court's 
order promulgating the 1993 
amendments, dated April 22, 
1993, provided the amend­
ments would take effect on 
December 1, 1993 "and shall 
govern all proceedings in civil 
cases thereafter commenced 
and, insofar as just and practi-
cable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending." 1 The 
general proposition, therefore, is that the new rules apply in 
pending proceedings if the court finds their application in a 
particular case "just and practicable." The Supreme Court's 
pronouncement concerning how the amendments are to be 
applied is consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 2047(a), the statute 
governing the general law of retroactivity of rule changes. 
Section 2074(a) leaves the ultimate decision concerning the 
application of new f1lles to the presiding judge who is autho­
rized not to apply a new rule or amendment if its application 
uld not be feasible or would work injustice." 28 U.S.C. §
(Continued on Page 60) 
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YOU'VE GOT IT COMING -
WINNING DISCOVERY THROUGH 
EFFECTIVE MOTIONS PRACTICE 
By: David J. Stout, J.D. 
1. Introduction
An effective discovery motion begins with the underly­
ing discovery document and a thoughtful plan for discovery. 
A motion to compel or a motion for a protective order is 
generally won long before the 
filing of the motion. Carefully 
planned discovery, well-draft­
ed discovery documents, and 
a thorough knowledge of the 
substantive law of discovery 
are the essential prerequisites 
to effectively prosecuting dis­
covery motions. 
These materials will be­
gin with a brief overview of 
the more important substan­
tive legal points relevant to 
discovery. The materials will 
then address some of the more David J. Stout
recurrent problems encoun-
tered by counsel during the course of discovery. Finally, the 
discussion will examine the timing, form and content of 
discovery motions. 
(Continued on Page 65) 
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II. Overview: Substantive Law of Discovery
There is an enormous body of relevant law relating to 
discovery. The main parameters of this body of law, however, 
are fairly uniform and unexceptional. These materials will 
focus on New Mexico law and, where pertinent, law from the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Counsel are directed to the 
Butterworth publication Hall, B. and Adams, C., New Mexico 
Discovery Manual ( 1992) for a comprehensive treatment of 
the subject. 
A. Scope of Discovery
SCRA J-026(B) 1 provides that "[p]arties may obtain 
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." 
In addition, "it is not ground for objection that the information 
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information 
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence." The rule has three essential compo­
nents that require independent evaluation. First, the informa­
tion must be relevant.2 Second it must not be subject to some 
privilege. Third the information is discoverable even if inad­
missible, so long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
The general rule governing discovery is to permit the 
liberal investigation of claims. See Ruiz v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (Ct. App. 
I 981 ). The presumption is in favor of discovery. See 
Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394,649 P.2d 462 (1982). 
The rules of discovery are intended to permit the parties to 
discover all of the relevant facts, see Carter v. Burn Con­
struction Co., Inc., 85 N.M. 27, 508 P.2d 1324 (Ct. App. 
1973), to eliminate surprise and to permit the full preparation 
of a case. See Redman v. Board of Regents, 102 N.M. 225, 
693 P. 2d 1266 (Ct. App. 1984). 
The general scope of discovery is the same in federal 
court. 3 The federal courts have consistently affirmed the 
proposition that the discovery rules should be broadly and 
liberally construed. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. I 04, 
114-115 ( 1964). The Tenth Circuit adheres to a philosophy of
liberal discovery. See In Re Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
570 F. 2d 899, 902 (I 0th Cir. 1978).
A discovery request should be considered relevant if 
there is any possibility that the information sought may be 
relevant to the subject matter of the litigation. See Sherman 
Park Community Association v. Wauwatosa Realty Co., 
486 F. Supp. 838 (E.D. Wis. 1980); In Re Folding Carton 
Antitrust Litigation, 83 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
The right to discover information is not, however, 
unlimited.4 '"[T]he right to discovery is a qualified right . . .  '" 
particularly when it involves inspection pursuant to Rule 
34(a) wherein courts have "uniformly scrutinized the prob­
lems to insure that the anticipated benefits are real and 
necessary, and that the burdens will not be intolerable." 
Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 588 F. 2d 904, 
908, n. 12 ( 4th Cir. 1978) quoting 8 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure § 2040 at 286-87 ( 1970). "Discovery 
has ultimate and necessary boundaries" and "discovery has 
limits . . .  [that] grow more formidable as the showing of need 
decreases." Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumber's 
Local Union, 657 F. 2d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 1981 ). 
The "ultimate and necessary boundaries" to discovery 
mean that discovery requests cannot be so burdensome as to 
constitute a kind of harassment, nor so vague that it is unfair 
to have a party respond. On the other hand, the mere assertion 
that a request for production is unduly burdensome is insuffi­
cient. See Panola Land Buyers Association v. Shuman, 762 
F. 2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985); Josephs v. Harris Corp.,
677 F. 2d 985, 992 (3rd Cir. 1982); Resick v. American
Dental Association, 90 F.R.D. 530, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1981);
Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F. Supp. 255,258 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The objecting party must demonstrate how each discovery
request is objectionable. Chubb v. Integrated Systems, Ltd.
v. National Bank of Washington, I 03 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D. D.C.
1984). Neither a general or conclusionary statement that a
request for discovery is unduly burdensome or a general
objection to discovery fulfills the responding party's burden
to object with specificity. See Lackey v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 90 N.M. 65, 559 P. 2d 1192 (Ct. App. 1976). Chubb v. 
Integrated Systems, Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington,
103 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D. D.C. 1984). The party seeking to block
discovery must show by specific statements how interrogato­
ries are overbroad or unduly burdensome and thereby estab­
lish a basis in fact for the conclusionary statements contained
in its objections. See White v. Wirtz, 402 F. 2d 145, 148 (I 0th
Cir. 1968). Courts have rejected the bold claim often made
that any investigation required by discovery is burdensome.
See generally 4A Moore's Federal Practice para. 33.20 at
33-103-104 (2d ed. 1988) and the cases collected therein.
Whether a request is burdensome may involve the court 
in a balancing process. Hoffman v. E.E.O.C., 117 F.R.D. 
436,438 (D. Kan. 1987)( court "should balance the burden on 
the interrogated party against the benefit to the discovering 
party"). Part of the balancing process involves whether the 
information is equally available to the party seeking discov­
ery. See Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 
431, 435-36 (E.D. Pa. 1978)( court refuses to require party to 
compile information equally available to the requesting par­
ty).s 
A party seeking a protective order has the burden to 
establish good cause why the discovery should be denied or 
limited. The courts have insisted on a particular and specific 
demonstration of facts, as distinguished from stereotyped and 
conclusionary statements, in order to establish good cause. 8 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 
2035 at 265. Accordingly, federal courts have repeatedly 
denied general and conclusionary objections to discovery on 
the grounds of"undue burden." See e.g., White v. Wirtz, 402 
F. 2d 145 (I 0th Cir. 1968); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805
F. 2d 1, 7 ( I st Cir. 1986); Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
785 F. 2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986); Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686
F. 2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982). Reference to numerous other
documents in avoidance of a direct answer to the interrogato-
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ry, complete in itself and under oath, is insufficient. Ferrara 
v. Balistreri & DiMaio, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 147 (D. Mass.
1985); United States v. Ciba Corp., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 95
(D.N.J. 1971); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzer­
land Information Center, Inc., 2 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 543
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
B. Privileges
The privileges which may be relevant to discovery are 
both statutory and common law. By far the most significant 
are the attorney client privilege and the doctrine of attorney 
work product.6 Simple declarations that privileges exist are 
insufficient. Varo, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 729 F.R.D. 
739, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1989,). The party seeking to establish the 
privilege bears the burden to establish the existence of a 
factual basis for the privilege or the factual basis for the 
applicability of the work product doctrine. See Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell& Co. v. West, T48 F. 2d 540,542 [10th Cir. 7984,). 
United States v. Lopez, 777 F. 2d 543 (10th Cir. 7985,). 
Simple declarations that the attorney client privilege 
and the doctrine of attorney work product apply are 
insufficient. 
The scope of attorney-client privilege and work-prod­
uct doctrine should be given the narrowest construction 
consistent with their respective purposes because they hinder 
the investigation of the truth. Pete Rinaldi's Fast Foods v. 
Great American Ins. Co., 123 F.R.D. 198, 201 (M.D.N.C. 
1988). The attorney client privilege should be narrowly con­
strued. In Re Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena, 697 F. 2d 
277 (I 0th Cir. 1983); In Re Diasonics Securities Litigation, 
110 F.R.D. 570, 572 (D. Colo. 1986). 
A corporation is entitled to assert the attorney-client 
privilege on its own behalf. See Upjohn Company v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981); Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 
(1985). 
1. Attorney Client Privilege
SCRA 11-503 sets out the attorney client privilege. It is 
beyond the scope of these materials to address, more than 
superficially the contours of this complex privilege. Basically 
the privilege protects (I) confidential communications; (2) 
between a lawyer (or lawyer's agent) and a client; (3) for the 
purposes of rendering legal services. The way to attack or 
establish the privilege is to break down and focus upon each 
element. There is very little New Mexico law that addresses 
the privilege. Therefore, these materials will provide some 
simple observations. 
a. The person advocating the privilege has the burden of
establishing the existence of the privilege. State v. Gallegos, 
92 N.M. 370,588 P. 2d 1045 (Ct. App. 1978). 
b. The communication must have been intended to be
confidential. State v. Deutsch, 103 N.M. 752,713 P.2d 1008 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
c. Presence of another lawyer does not destroy the
confidential nature of the communication. State v. Valdez, 95 
N.M. 70, 618 P. 2d 1234 (1980).
d. Third party disclosure operates as a waiver of the
privilege. See United States v. Bump, 605 F. 2d 548, 551 
(10th Cir. 1979). Jonathan Corp. v. Prince Computer, Inc., 
114 F.R.D. 693,697 (E.D. Va. 1987) ("Any disclosure incon­
sistent with maintaining the confidential nature of the attor­
ney client privilege waives the attorney client privilege."). 
e. The attorney client privilege protects the communi­
cation, but not the facts underlying the communication. See 
State v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P. 2d 431 (1966). 
f. The attorney-client privilege protects confidential
communications between a client and the client's attorney 
acting in the capacity of a legal advisor. See In Re Matter of 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 697 F. 2d 277 (10th Cir. 1983); 
Colorado v. Schmidt-Tiago Construction Co., 108 F.R.D. 
731 (D. Colo. 1985). 
2. Attorney Work Product
The universally accepted definition of attorney work 
product is derived from the text of Rule 26(b)(3). Attorney 
work product requires that the material be "( 1) a document or 
other tangible thing, (2) prepared in anticipation of litigation 
or for trial, and (3) prepared by or for the opposing party's 
attorney or representative." Langdon v. Champion, 752 P. 
2d 999, 1005 (Alaska 1988) and the extensive authorities 
cited there. The doctrine of attorney work product as explicat­
ed by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v. 
Taylor, reflects a policy decision to protect the professional 
efforts of an attorney or the attorney's representative. See 
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 
487F. 2d 480,483 (4th Cir. 1973); Carter v. Burn Construc­
tion Co., Inc., 85 N.M. 27, 31,508 P. 2d 1324 (Ct. App. 1973) 
(pre-rule case requiring a showing of good cause for produc­
tion of attorney work product). 
The work product doctrine protects an attorney's 
thoughts and mental impressions, but does not protect rele­
vant facts, otherwise nonprivileged, in an attorney's file. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).7 The work 
product doctrine as explicated in Hickman, is "expressly 
limited to those matters relating to the lawyer's mental pro­
cess developed explicitly for litigation." Vargas v. United 
States, 727 F. 2d 941,945 (10th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). 
Both state and federal rules governing attorney work 
product recognize a distinction between what might be called 
ordinary work product and that type of work product which 
discloses the lawyers "mental impressions, conclusions, opin­
ions, or legal theories." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )(3); SCRA l -
026(B)( 4 ). Ordinary work product may be discovered upon a 
particularized showing of need, but the mental impressions, 
opinions and legal theories of counsel may not be discovered, 
period. Ordinary work product, however, may be discovered 
"only upon a showing that the party seeking the discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in preparation of his case and 
that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substan-
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tial equivalent of the materials by other means." Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(3); SCRA l-026(B)(4).
a. Prepared in Anticipation of Litigation
Whether a document is prepared in anticipation of 
litigation is usually the central inquiry to determine work 
product.8 Preparation in anticipation of litigation within the 
meaning of Rule 26 is based on "the primary motivating 
purpose behind the creation of the document.'' Janicker v. 
George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. 648 (D.D.C 
7982); United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F. 2d 292 (Temp. 
Emerg. Ct. 7985); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat. Presto Industries, 
Inc., 709 F. 2d 1709 (7th Cir. 1983). 
The mere anticipation of the contingency of litigation 
does not automatically transform an investigative report or 
other communication into work product. See Soeder v. Gen­
eral Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253,255 (D. Nev. 1980); 
Janicker v. George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. at 
650. An undifferentiated objection that information sought by
a party was prepared in anticipation of litigation has been
generally rejected by the courts. Most courts require some
"objective facts establishing an identifiable resolve to litigate
prior to the investigative efforts resulting in the report before
the work product doctrine becomes applicable. See, e.g., Fine
v. Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co., 91 F.R.D. 115
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 61 F.R.D. 115 (N.D. Ga. 1972). 
Janiker v. George Washington University, 94 F.R.D. at 
650. 
Some courts have required that there be a substantial 
probability oflitigation before a party can claim that work was 
fairly done in anticipation of litigation. See APL Corp v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 91 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1980) 
(Substantial probability litigation would occur did not arise 
until final determination to deny plaintiffs claim was made.)9; 
Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 712 (N.D. 
Ga. 1974) (The probability of a specific litigation must be 
substantial and the commencement of the suit must be immi­
nent before the privilege may be invoked.) See also Langon 
v. Champion, 752 P. 2d 999, 1005 (Alaska 1988)("The
majority of courts dealing with the problem have taken the 
position that litigation is not 'anticipated' until the expecta­
tion oflitigation is such than an attorney has become involved
in the dispute and has prepared the documents himself or has 
requested their preparation."). Other courts have required that
the "primary motivating purpose behind the document or
investigative report must be to aid in possible future litiga­
tion." Janiker v. George Washington University, 94 F.R.D.
at 650.
Written material will not be protected by the work 
product doctrine if there is only a contingency that prospec-
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tive future litigation may occur. Whitman by Whitman v. 
United States, 108 F.R.D. at 9; Janicker v. George Wash­
ington University, 94 F.R.D. at 650; Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat. 
Presto Industries, Inc., 709 F. 2d at 1119. 
The mere anticipation of the contigency of litigation does 
not automatically transform an investigative report into 
work product. 
b. Work Product Doctrine does not Insulate the
Underlying Facts from Discovery. 
Work product doctrine also does not protect communi­
cations of facts to an attorney. Jaroslawicz v. Engelhard 
Corp., 115 F.R.D. 515 (D.N.J. 1987); Upjohn Co. v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-6 (1981); Sedco Intern., S.A. v. 
Cory, 683 F. 2d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1027. See also State v. Steinkraus, 76 N.M. 617,620, 
417 P. 2d 431 (1966); Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. 
Supp. 1116, 1117 (D.Mont. 1986). Thus, certain materials 
may fall within the work product doctrine, but the discovering 
party may nevertheless be entitled to the factual information 
contained in the materials. Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 
114 F.R.D. at 641. 
c. Work Product can be Waived
Work product immunity can be waived. United States 
v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225. 95 S. Ct. 2760, 45 L. Ed. 2d 747
('7975); In re Sealed Case, 676 F. 2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1987);
Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titantium Metals Corp. of
America, 97 F.R.D. 84 (E.D.N.Y. 7987); Electronic Mem­
ories & Magnetics Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 20 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 705 (N.D. Ill. 7975). The production of some privi­
leged documents may waive the privilege as to all documents
of the same subject matter. Nye v. Sage Products, Inc., 36
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 206, 207 (N.D. 111. 7982);
Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equipment Corp., 787 USPQ
731 (N.D. Ill. 1974). A word of caution: courts are generally
quite reluctant to find and enforce such waivers, particularly
when the disclosure was inadvertent. See Hartman v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 107 N.M. 196, 763 P. 2d 1144 (1988)
(discussing when privilege is lost for inadvertent disclosure).
C. A Potpourri of Issues
There are a number of issues which recur with sufficient 
regularity to warrant some discussion. This list is by no means 
comprehensive and obviously reflects the nature and experi­
ence of my practice. 
I. Insurance Claims Files
(D.Del. 1975); LaRocca v. State Farm Mutual Insurance 
Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Shapiro v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 44 F.R.D. 429 (E.D. Pa. 1968). 
The discovery of insurance claims files also cannot be 
avoided by using a lawyer as a claims adjustor or simply 
copying a lawyer with work done by an adjustor. See Western 
National Bank of Denver v. Employers Insurance of 
Wausau, 109 F.R.D. 55, 57 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[T]his rule also 
includes investigations by a person who is an attorney but 
acting in the capacity of an investigator and adjustor for the 
insurance company. Reiss v. British General Insurance 
Co., 9 F.R.D. 610,611 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Nesbitt v. Hauck, 
15 F.R.D. 254, 256 (N.D.S.D. 1954). "). 
Investigation and claims files created in the ordinary 
course of the insurer's business are properly discoverable. See 
Western National Bank of Denver 109 F.R.D. 55 (D. Colo. 
1985); Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co., 91 
F.R.D. 420 (1981 ); APL Corporation v. Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Co., 91 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1980); Mission 
National Insurance Company v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160 (D. 
Minn. 1986) ("[I]t would not be fair to allow _the insurer's 
decision in this regard to create a blanket obstruction to 
discovery ofits claims investigation. To the extent that Cozen 
& O'Connor lawyers acted as claims adjusters, then, their 
work-product, communications to client, and impressions 
about the facts will be treated herein as the ordinary business 
of plaintiff [insurer], outside the scope of the asserted privi­
leges. This approach results in the majority of the file being 
discoverable."); Western National Bank of Denver v. Em­
ployers Insurance of Wausau, 109 F.R.D. 55 (D. Colo. 
1985) (Rejecting claims of attorney-client and work-product 
privileges over insurance files). 
There is substantial legal authority demonstrating the 
discoverability of an insurer's files, or of an investigative law 
firm's files, in a suit on both the contractual and bad faith 
theories. See, e.g., Pete Rinaldi's Fast Foods, Inc. v. Great 
American Insurance, 123 F.R.D. 198 (M.D.N.C. 1988); 
Mission National Insurance Company v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 
160 (D. Minn. 1986); Western National Bank of Denver v. 
Employers Insurance of Wausau, 109 F.R.D. 55 (D. Colo. 
1985); Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Insurance Co., 91 
F.R.D. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); APL Corporation v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Company, 91 F.R.D. 10 (D. Md. 1980). 
There is also authority to the contrary. See, e.g. Dunn v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 122 F.R.D. 507 (N.D. Miss. 
1988). Some courts have refused to order production of the 
claims files until the underlying contractual dispute over 
coverage has been concluded. See Bergesen v. Marsillo, 112 
F.R.D. 692 (D. Mont. 1986); Bartlett v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 538 A.2d 997 (R.l. 1988). 
Claims files of insurance companies which contain the 2• Discovery for Punitive Damages 
work and thoughts of adj us tors are universally subject to A succinct statement of the rule is "[ w ]here punitive 
discovery in cases that involve allegations of bad faith. See damages are sought, defendant's current financial condition 
e.g., Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, is discoverable." 4 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & G. Grotheer, Moore's 
54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972); McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F. Federal Practice para. 26.56[5] at 26-154 (2d ed. 1987). On 
2d 468 ( 4th Cir. 1972); Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342 this particular point the cases are in almost universal agree-
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ment. See Fretz v. Kelter, 109 F.R.D. 303, 310 (D.Kan. 
1985); Renshaw v. Ravert, 82 F.R.D. 367, 363 (E.D.Pa. 
7979); Miller v. Doctor's General Hospital, 76 F.R.D. 136, 
740 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transpor­
tation Co., 97 N.M. 794,202,638 P. 2d 406 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Evidence of a defendant's financial condition is admis­
sible for the purpose of establishing an appropriate amount of 
punitive damages. See Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F. 2d 
I 092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1984); Ruiz, 97 N.M. at 202. "The fact 
that the information sought will be admissible is a strong 
argument in favor of discovery." American Benefit Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ille, 87 F.R.D. 540,542 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (Permitting 
pretrial discovery of defendant's financial condition for claim 
of punitive damages.) 
Defendants often do not dispute the relevance of the 
financial information to a claim for punitive damages. Rather, 
defendants frequently assert that the relevant financial infor­
mation will not be produced prior to a primafacie showing of 
liability for punitive damages. This is simply an attempt to 
superimpose an additional requirement onto the clear lan­
guage off ed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l). My experience has been that 
this novel claim is usually rejected by the courts. 
The argument is that if plaintiff cannot make a prima 
facie showing of liability to sustain an award of punitive 
damages, then evidence of defendant's financial condition 
will be inadmissible at trial. While that is true, the argument 
moves one step further by suggesting that plaintiff cannot 
discover the information until there is a threshold showing of 
admissibility. This claim is defeated by the plain language of 
Rule 26(b)(l ). The Rule provides that "[i]t is not grounds for 
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at 
the trial i f the information sought appears reasonably calculat­
ed to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." The 
current financial condition of defendants may very well be 
admissible at trial and thus plaintiffs discovery request is 
certainly reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. Indeed, the information itself is poten­
tially admissible. The fact that this information may not be 
admissible is simply an irrelevant consideration under the 
unequivocal language of the rule. It is discoverable regardless 
of its admissibility. 
The case of Hughes v. Grove, 47 F.R.D. 52 (W.D. Mo. 
1969) is helpful for the party seeking the discovery. In 
Hughes, the defendant objected to an interrogatory which 
sought information pertaining to defendant's assets, liabili­
ties, and earnings. Defendant argued to the district court, as do 
Defendants here, that the interrogatory was "premature" and 
that more than a simple allegation and claim for punitive 
damages was required to permit the discovery sought by 
plaintiff. The district court rejected defendant's argument 
and held that "[n]o prirnafacie showing in punitive damages 
is required to justify discovery." Id. at 55. The Hughes case 
is entirely within the mainstream of judicial opinion on this 
issue. See also Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 
(D. Haw. 1975); Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 210, 23 
Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962). 
3. Production of Witness Lists
As the Supreme Court has noted "civil trials in the 
federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The 
way is not clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the 
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues 
and facts before trial." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,501 
(1947). 
Not surprisingly courts have required parties to answer 
interrogatories seeking the identification of potential trial 
witnesses. See, e.g., Lewis v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 20 
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1091, 1092 (D. S.C. 1975)(Requiring iden­
tification of trial witnesses three years after complaint filed 
since "plaintiffs should know by now who will be called as a 
witness, and if they do not know, the answer to this interrog­
atory will assist them in the preparation of their case.''); 
United States v. 216 Bottles, More or Less, 36 F.R.D. 695, 
701 (E.D.N. Y. 1965)(Purpose of interrogatory seeking names 
of witnesses is to discover facts and narrow issues. "Disclo­
sure of the names of witnesses with knowledge of the facts 
would accomplish this purpose."); United States v. Northside 
Realty Associates, Inc., 15 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 17, 27,324 F. 
Supp. 287 (N.D. Ga. 1971). 
Claims files of insurance companies which contain the 
work and thoughts of adjustors are universally subject to 
discovery in cases that involve allegations of bad faith. 
The Tenth Circuit has also held that the district court has 
the discretion to order the production of a witness list during 
discovery. See Brock v. R.J. Auto Parts and Service, Inc., 
864 F. 2d 677, 679 (10th Cir. 1988). The court in Brock 
indicated that a party must show a particular need for the 
production of a witness list prior to the pretrial conference, at 
least in the context of a Fair Labor Standards Act case. 
4. Appeal from Magistrate
In New Mexico federal district court and in many 
jurisdictions virtually all of the discovery matters are heard in 
the first instance by the magistrates. It is sometimes necessary 
to take an appeal from the Magistrate's ruling. The issue then 
becomes whether the Magistrate's ruling, considered in light 
of the record, is clearly erroneous, contrary to law, or an abuse 
of discretion. 
Magistrates are empowered to preside over pretrial 
matters. 28 U.S.C. sec. 636(b)(l)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A 
ruling entered by a magistrate upon non-dispositive motions 
such as a motion to compel or a motion for protective order 
may be set aside only if clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 
Magistrates have been extended broad discretion over discov­
ery matters and as a matter of law, their decisions on such 
disputes are entitled to substantial deference. Aries Ventures 
Ltd. v. Axa FinanceS.A., 12 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
In view of the above, the rulings of a magistrate on 
discovery matters, insofar as they concern issues of relevancy 
that are traditionally left to the discretion of the trial court, are 
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reviewed not for clear error, but for abuse of discretion. 
Geophysical Systems Corp. v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 8 Fed. R. 
Serv. 3d 464 (C.D. Ca. 1987). 
5. In Camera Inspection
Frequently discovery disputes revolve around very spe­
cific characterizations of documents. The discovering party is 
at a distinct disadvantage in responding to the characteriza­
tion since the document is not in his or her possession. On such 
occasions it is wise to request an in camera inspection of the 
documents to prove up the nature of the document and to test 
the claims or characterizations of party opposing the discov­
ery. See International Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Unit­
ed Telephone Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 185 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (in 
camera inspection necessary to test assertion of work prod­
uct). The discovering party should be ready to make this 
request particularly where the opposing party has not laid an 
adequate basis for the assertion of the privilege. See Nutmeg 
Insurance Co. v. Atwell & Sterling, 120 F.R.D. 504 (W.D. 
La. 1988) (proponent of privilege must provide enough infor­
mation to determine the privilege and must provide detailed 
affidavits that precise facts exist to support the claim of 
privilege). 10 
6. Witness Statements
The rule in New Mexico is that a witness statement 
prepared in anticipation of litigation can be discovered only 
upon a showing of "substantial need and undue hardship." 
Knight v. Presbyterian Hospital Center, 98 N.M. 523, 526, 
650 P. 2d 45 (Ct. App. 1982);cjBloom v. Lewis, 97N.M.435, 
640 P.2d 935 (Ct. App. 1980) rev'd on other grounds 96 N.M. 
63, 628 P. 2d 308 (I 98 I) (pre-rule case holding that a tape 
recorded statement was work product and discoverable only 
upon showing of good cause). 
III. The Discovery Plan
At the outset of every case it is desirable to sit down and 
evaluate the precise information you need to prove your case. 
What are the elements of proof that will establish liability or 
conversely what information is necessary to defeat a claim or 
limit damages. Once those are identified, you can proceed to 
chart out precisely what discovery is necessary to obtain that 
information. Discovery can then be drafted with those specif­
ic objective in mind. 
Now, how does this relate to discovery motions prac­
tice? There are three important points flowing from a careful­
ly calculated discovery plan which are important for discov­
ery motions. First, by identifying just the information you 
need, you can draft discovery requests which can't be object­
ed to on the basis of relevance, that is you can always 
demonstrate the relevance of the request because it is specif­
ically related to proof of an essential element. Second, this 
process forces you to examine and understand your case. This 
will necessarily result in better drafted discovery. Most mer­
itorious discovery objections are the result of sloppy or 
careless drafting. Third, you can analyze your discovery 
needs to plan out a sequence of written discovery which 
allows you to maximize the efficacy of your discovery re­
quests. 
IV. Timing of Discovery Motions
A. Confer in Good Faith
Once discovery requests have been answered when is it 
time to file a motion to compel?' 1 In federal court there is a 
requirement that you confer in good faith with opposing 
counsel in an effort to resolve the discovery dispute. D.N.M. 
LR-37.1. The local rule further requires that you "certify" 
what efforts have been made to resolve the dispute. There is 
no analogous rule on a state wide basis in New Mexico 
although there is a general requirement that counsel seek 
concurrence for a motion prior to filing the motion. See SCRA 
1-007. l . 12 Some of the New Mexico districts have a local rule
imposing the confer in good faith requirement, see, e.g., 1st
Judicial Dist. LR 303( d), 13 others do not. When you are in state
court, you always need to check the local rules of the district
in which the case is filed. Regardless of the requirements of
any rule, it is simply the better practice to seek to resolve the
dispute before filing a motion to compel. It is recommended
that in most cases you send a letter ciearly and succinctly
setting forth the reasons why you are entitled to the discovery.
There are several benefits to this approach. First, it allows you
to organize your own thoughts and arguments concerning the
disputed to discovery. This gives you a leg up in the event a
motion does have to be filed. Second, it allows you to
document the good faith effort to confer and to propose
reasonable alternatives. This last point bears further discus­
sion. Discovery is often a series of compromises. There is a
distinct advantage when filing a motion to compel or a motion
for a protective order to be able to demonstrate what efforts
you have made to be reasonable and to offer fair alternatives
which, if accepted, would have resulted in an informal reso­
lution. Courts tend to take a dim view of absolutist positions
in discovery.
The propounding party is probably in the best position 
to offer the compromise and, where possible, should make the 
offer at the outset of the dispute. The party resisting discovery 
can often "steal the march" by sending a letter accompanying 
discovery responses which offers to resolve certain of the 
disputes via some alternative channel. E.g. Produce five years 
of tax returns instead of ten. 
The good faith conference letter should always request 
a "Vaughn Index" for any documents where the responding 
party has claimed one of the privileges.14 The "Vaughn Index" 
is no more than a listing of the documents claimed to be 
privileged with sufficient information about the document to 
permit the party to test the privilege. The instructions to a Rule 
34 request for production of documents should always in­
clude a request to the responding party to identify documents 
withheld on the basis of a privilege with sufficient specificity 
to allow the privilege to be tested. 15 
B. Motion to Compel
The timing for a motion to compel is determined by the 
rules. In federal court there are twenty (20) days from the 
"receipt" of an objection to file the motion. See D.N.M. LR-
33.2. The twenty days includes whatever time is required to 
seek an informal resolution of the dispute, though the federal 
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court here has been generous in extending that time where 
there is a possibility that the parties can resolve the problem. 
There is no consistent rule in the state courts of New 
Mexico. The First Judicial District has a twenty day limitation 
in which to file a motion to compel, see I st Judicial Dist. LR 
303(c), and the Second Judicial District has no such limita­
tion. 
C. Motion for Protective Order
There is no established rule for seeking a motion for a 
protective order pursuant to Rule 26( c) or SCRA l-026(C) 
directed to written discovery other than prior to the date the 
response is due. In the case of depositions the requirements 
are somewhat different. In federal court reasonable notice for 
a deposition is ten (10) days. D.N.M. LR-30.1. If a party 
wishes to avoid appearing for the deposition then the motion 
for a protective order must be filed at least three (3) days prior 
to the scheduled deposition. If this requirement is met then the 
failure to appear is not considered willful under Rule 37(d) or 
contumacious under Rule 45(f) unless the motion was frivo­
lous or dilatory. 16 See D.N.M. LR-30.1 Notice of non-appear­
ance must be provided to all parties. D.N.M. LR-30.1. 
The rules are somewhat different in New Mexico state
court. Reasonable notice for a deposition is five (5) days.
SCRA l -030(H). The deponent must appear unless there is a
court order obtained prohibiting the discovery. See Wieneke
v. Chalmers, 73 N.M. 8, 14,385 P.2d 65 (1963) (motion for
protective order or motion to quash deposition notice are not
self-executing and until an order is made in connection with
the motion there is "nothing to delay the taking of deposi­
tion").
V. The Form and Content of the Motion
So, now you have a discovery plan. You have carefully 
and thoughtfully drafted your discovery requests. You have 
followed the local rules and have just the right number of 
interrogatories and subparts.17 The responses have been re­
turned and they are full of objections. You have sent a letter 
discussing the objections and even proposing some alterna­
tives forms of production. There has been no response. You 
have researched the substantive law governing the discovery 
issues and are thoroughly familiar with the arguments. The 
time has come to draft the motion. 18 If you have done these 
things, the motions and accompanying memoranda will write 
themselves. 
A. Keep it short, simple and sweet
The first step is to familiarize yourself with the extend­
ed provisions of Rule 37 or SCRA 1-037 which control the 
formal process of compelling discovery. The case load of the 
state and federal courts continues to far outpace the number of 
judges available to do the work. 19 As a result, the most 
effective discovery motions will be short, pointed, and clear.20 
I would suggest making the motion very short and conclusory 
and reserving the complete discussion for the memorandum 
that accompanies the motion. The discussion should be orga­
nized around the specific discovery request in dispute and the 
body of the brief should set out both the request and the 
response.21 For example: 
Request for Production No. 1: 
All individual or business tax returns for the past 
10 years. 
Response: 
Objection, this request constitutes an unreason­
able invasion of privacy, it is premature in that 
there has not even been a prima facie showing of 
any actions on the part of these Defendants which 
would give rise to a punitive damage claim. 
There are several benefits which follow from this simple 
organizational format. First, it provides a built-in outline for 
your legal discussion. Second, it allows the court to review the 
specific discovery dispute directly in the context of your 
argument. Third, it saves the court from having to flip back 
and forth from the brief to the exhibits. 
The final ingredient to top off your brief and argument 
is what I call "keeping it sweet." A void the sometimes 
irresistible temptation to refer to opposing counsel in some­
what less than gracious terms, you misbegotten son-of-an­
ape. Ad personam attacks always, repeat always, detract from 
the presentation and provide the reader with little more than 
an unwanted distraction. Don't squander you own credibility 
with the Court by making like a pit bull. Save your fulmina­
tions and the odd ban mot for those incredibly rare occasions 
when they might constitute effective advocacy. 
A void the sometimes irresistible temptation to refer to 
opposing counsel in somewhat less than gracious terms. 
B. Explain the Specific Relationship between the
Discovery Sought and the Rest of Your Case. 
After you have briefly set out the contours of the 
dispute, you need to proceed with the argument. The single 
most important point to convey is why the specific discovery 
is important to the case. Although this simple point seems 
self-evident, the greatest shortcoming in discovery motions is 
the failure to clearly describe for the court the relationship 
between the information sought and the rest of the case. A 
discovery motion should always begin with a brief descrip­
tion of the case. Those specific facts which bear upon the 
discovery issue should be highlighted and developed. You 
can't expect a court unfamiliar with the case to decide a 
motion in a vacuum. You will win 90% of the motions in 
which you establish the relationship between the discovery 
sought and some important part of the case. 
C. Keep the Citations to a Minimum
Like the "Naked City" there are thousands of cases 
relating to discovery. A void simply stringing together a group 
of citations, particularly for the basic standards. The court is 
familiar with the essential body of law governing discovery. 
Look and cite those cases which are factually apposite and 
';, therefore directly relevant to the issues. If you have a case or 
two which are particularly compelling, then attach them to the 
brief. You want to be sure that the court or the law clerk reads 
your best authority. 
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VI. Enforcement of Discovery Orders and Sanctions
What follows is a brief description of the general
process for both obtaining sanctions for failure to provided 
discovery and enforcing discovery orders. There are a variety 
of grounds available for the imposition of discovery sanc­
tions. The choice of the sanction lies within the discretion of 
the court. See United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.,
96 N.M. 155, 629 P.2d 231 (1980). The trial court's decision 
on the appropriate sanction is therefore reviewable only for 
abuse of discretion. See Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn,
Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1984). Where, 
however, the "ultimate" sanction of default is imposed, which 
requires a finding of willfulness, the court's determination 
that the failure to comply with a discovery order was willful 
must be supported by substantial evidence. Lopezv. Walmart
Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 259, 771 P.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"Set the stage" for your motion by explaining a little bit 
about the lawsuit and show just how the discovery issues 
relate to the case as a whole. 
A. Grounds for Sanctions
Failure or refusal to provide discovery may give rise to 
sanctions. It applies to all forms of discovery directed to a 
party including interrogatories, requests for production, and 
depositions. It may also apply to non-parties. It may apply to 
failures to follow or obey orders under SCRA 1-026 such as 
protective orders. See SCRA l -037(B). 
B. Procedure for Sanctions
In order to proceed for sanctions against the non­
responding party, the propounding party must first move for 
an order to compel. Once you have obtained the order to 
compel then you can enforce the order. If the non-responding 
party failures to obey the order to compel, then you can move 
for sanctions. State ex rel. New Mexico State Police v. One
1978 Buick Lesabre, 108 N.M. 612,775 P. 2d 1329 (Ct. App. 
1989). The court can, however, enter a dismissal without a
prior order for untruthful answers in discovery. See Sandoval
v. Martinez, 109 N.M. 5, 780 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1989).
C. Sanctions Available
There are a variety of sanctions available for the failure 
to obey a discovery order. 
1. Failure of a deponent to be sworn or to answer may
be considered a contempt of court. SCRA l -037(B)(l). 
2. Failure to obey discovery order may result in the
designation of facts as established, striking pleading or claims, 
dismissal of the action, or judgment by default. 
3. In addition or instead of other sanctions the court
shall require the party or the attorney or both to pay reason­
able expenses including attorney's fees, unless the failure to 
comply was substantially justified or it would be otherwise 
unjust. SCRA l -037(B)(2). · · 
4. Default or dismissa(may not be imposed unless the
nonresponding party's <::Ptj,dia'.ct,,Js;'wiUfuhor ,in ·.bad faith .. -. ' ,,, ,< ... '••U n ,"'l, .:".:-,' ,.) ., •· · • •  
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. I 55, 
629 P .2d 231 ( 1980). 
VII. Postscript
After I finished drafting these materials I contacted a
very experienced staff attorney with the United States District 
Court here and inquired about two points. First, what things 
make for an effective presentation of a discovery issue; 
Second, what were the major shortcomings of motions she 
reviewed. Here, in summary form are her very worthwhile 
observations: 
1. Remember that the person reading the motion and
brief may only have read the complaint (and maybe not) and 
knows nothing else about the case. "Set the stage" for your 
motion by explaining a little bit about the lawsuit and show 
just how the discovery issues relate to the case as a whole. 
Don't just jump into the discussion assuming the reader is 
familiar with the intricacies of the case. 
2. Remember that the Court has a large caseload.
Carefully organize your discovery motion. She suggested two 
possible organizational possibilities. You could do it discov­
ery request by discovery request. She referred to this method 
as kind ofa "mini-motion" for each request. This is probably 
the preferred method, unless you are dealing with a large 
number of disputed requests. If that is the case then you should 
try to address categories of requests by subject matter. E.g.
"This part of the motion relates to requests 1, 5, 8, and 9 which 
concern the claim of trade secrets." 
3. When you are raising a claim of privilege, make sure
you have established the case for the privilege. Show how 
each necessary element of the privilege is factually estab-
lished element by element. She pointed out that this showing 
ought to be made in the discovery response itself and that if 
you have waited for the motion and/or response you may run 
the risk of having waived the privilege; that is, courts increas­
ingly are requiring more than a categorical assertion of 
privilege in the discovery response itself. 
4. Whenever possible use indices or charts that list and
identify the documents for which there is a claim of privilege. 
The index or chart should show how each document fits the 
claim of privilege. 
5. Don't forget to attach a copy of discovery of the
disputed discovery request together with the disputed re­
sponse. 
6. If you need an expedited hearing on the motion don't
bury the request on the last page of the motion or brief. Either 
file a separate request for expedited hearing or identify right 
up front in the motion that this motion requests expedited 
review. I might suggest the use of a title such as "Motion to 
Compel and Request for Expedited Hearing on Motion to 
Compel." 
7. A void joining a motion to compel with other motions.
This is particularly true of such substantive motions as a 
motion for summary judgment. Remember that the magistrate ,  
will address discovery matters and the district judge the ) 
substantive motions. By joining the two you are making 
matters more difficult to obtain an expeditious review. 
I 
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ENDNOTES 
I. The state and federal discovery rules are virtually identical. This
discussion will note any differences where relevant. 
2. The test for relevancy is broader than for the admission of
evidence. As one court has noted: "[The test for relevancy for purposes of 
discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )(I )  is broader than the test for 
admissibility at trial as the Rule specifically provides. Hence, a party may 
discovery information which is not admissible at trial if such information 
will have some probably effect on the organization and presentation of the 
moving party's case." Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F. 2d 462,472 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
3. The United States Supreme Court has clearly laid down the broad
rule for the proper scope of discovery: 
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are 
to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can 
the time-honored cry "fishing expedition" serve to preclude 
a party from inquiring into the fact underlying his oppo­
nent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts 
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Salitan v. Carillo, 69 
N.M. 476, 480, 368 P. 2d 149 ( 1961 )("No longer is the time-honored cry
of 'fishing expedition' available to block this discovery.").
4. The rules provide certain specific limitations. The discovery
sought cannot be "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive." SCRA l -026(8)(2)(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l )(i). Norean the 
discovery be "unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the 
needs of the case, the amount in the controversy, limitations on the parties' 
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." SCRA 
1-026(8)(2)( c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b )( I )(iii). 
5. Board of Education v. Admiral Heating and Ventilating, Inc.,
104 F.R.D. 23 (N.D. 111. 1984) provides a good example of where the 
balance tips in favor of the discovering party. Admiral Heating was a 
complex antitrust case and the issue was the form in which certain 
voluminous documents were to be produced. Id. at 36. The court simply 
ordered that under the particular facts of the case Rule 34(b) permitted 
plaintiffs to require the producing defendant to segregate the documents 
according to plaintiffs' discovery request. The bases for the decision were 
that (I) Rule 34 was specifically directed to documents; (2) the requests 
sought documents which would be show payoffs and the court was 
concerned that such documents could be buried in the mass of documents 
involved in the production. 
6. There are other important privileges which may be pertinent.
These are set forth in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence in Article 5. See,
e.g., SCRA 11-504 psychotherapist-patient privilege; SCRA 11-507 polit­
ical vote; SCRA I 1-508 trade secrets. There are also certain other types of
privilege which may attach to a particular process. For a substantive
discussion of these and-other evidentiary privileges see Vigil, J. Evidence
Handbook New Mexico and Federal at 69-96 ( 1992); Hall and Adams,
New Mexico Discovery Manual at 20-73 ( 1992).
7. It may be relevant that the materials were prepared by a non­
lawyer. See Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 644-45 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). In Hardy, the court determined that handwritten reports 
and other documents did not fall within the protection of the work product 
doctrine because they were handwritten by a non-attorney and prepared 
"only incidentally" to any possible litigation. 
8. An important factor in determining if documents are protected
under the work product doctrine is whether the document was prepared at 
the request or direction of an attorney, Hardy v. New York News, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 633,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Whitman by Whitman v. United
States, 108 F.R.D. 5 (D.N.H. 1985). 
9. In APL Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 91 F.R.D. 10,
(D. Md. 1980), the district court took note: "(A)etna felt there was a good 
possibility that litigation might result. Nevertheless, Aetna had to conduct 
a routine investigation of Plaintiffs claim prior to determining whether or 
not to indemnify APL ... Thus, it was not until it had conducted a thorough 
investigation of Plaintiffs claim that Aetna decided to deny Plaintiffs 
claim for indemnification. And it was not until that determination was 
made 'that there was a substantial probability that litigation would occur 
and that commencement of such litigation was imminent." (Citations 
omitted.) Id. at 21. 
I 0. A belated offer by the opposing party to submit documents for 
in camera review may be rejected because if untimely it would subvert the 
process of having the magistrate review discovery in the first instance. 
Varo, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 139, 142 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 
1989). 
11. The universal rule in that you must timely file objections to the 
discovery requests or the objection is waived. See United Nuclear Corp.
v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155 629 P.2d 231 (1980).
12. Arguably this general rule imposes a duty to attempt resolution 
of the dispute prior to filing a motion, since almost by definition a motion 
to compel will be opposed. 
13. The good faith effort to resolve a discovery dispute also extends 
to a motion for a protective order. See D.N.M. LR 37.1; 1st Judicial Dist. 
LR 303(d). 
14. The "Vaughn Index" is derived from the case of Vaughn v.
Rosen, 484 F. 2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973) where the United States was 
resisting a Freedom oflnformation Act request. In the course of examining 
the government's claim that certain categories of documents were exempt 
from discovery, the court created an indexing procedure which could be 
used by the court in determining which documents were exempt. 
15. The following is an example of such an instruction: "If any 
document is withheld on the basis ofany privilege or 'work product' claim, 
please identify the document so withheld, the person or persons who 
created the document, the person or persons who received or viewed the 
document, the person or persons to whom the document was addressed, the 
asserted basis for withholding the document in sufficient detail to permit 
the applicability of the asserted privilege or work product claim to be 
determined and identify each person who has or ever has had possession, 
custody, or control of the document or any copy thereof, or otherwise 
became aware of the document or information in question." 
16. The provisions of Rule 37(a)( 4) apply to the award of expenses 
in relation to the motion. 
17. You need to check the local rules to determine the number of
interrogatories which you can propound. The number in federal court is 
fifty (50) including subparts. See D.N.M. LR-33.1. The number in the I st 
Judicial District is also fifty including subparts. I st Judicial Dist. LR 
303(e). The rule is the same in the Second Judicial District with the 
qualification being that the rule provides for some basic information to be 
considered as a single interrogatory. See 2d Judicial Dist. LR 122(8)( I) 
and (2). A carefully drafted request of admissions followed by a single 
interrogatory asking for an explanation and basis for the denial can greatly 
expand the available questions. 
18. Similar considerations obtain for a motion for a protective 
order. The form and content of a motion for a protective order should be 
roughly the same as a response to a motion to compel. 
19. The discussion which follows is largely directed to the written 
presentation of motions. It is extraordinarily rare that you will have a 
hearing on a discovery motion in federal court. Increasingly in state court 
discovery motions are being determined on the basis of written submis­
sions. Obviously when you are fortunate enough to have a hearing you 
have another opportunity to persuade the court concerning your position 
on the issue. 
20. This is not the place for an extended discussion regarding 
effective written advocacy. Short, affirmative sentences using active voice 
will convey your points clearly and effectively. For those of you who 
desire a short and useful compendium of legal writing tips, I recommend 
Hollis Hurd's Writing for Lawyers.
21. You should attach as exhibits to the brief copies of the actual 
disco.�e�,r�u�l{�� !� �is is a requirement in federal court 
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